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The Government Perspective: Effects Upon
Present Competition Policy
Deborah K. Owen *
I. INTRODUCTION
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this program, and to fol-
low so many distinguished and thought-provoking speakers. Our com-
petitive relations with our neighbor to the north are of great interest to
me. One of the first cases that came before me at the beginning of my
tenure on the Federal Trade Commission was the proposed acquisition of
Connaught Biosciences of Canada by the Institut Merieux subsidiary of
Rhone-Poulenc' - a transaction that involved overlapping sales by both
companies in U.S. markets. It was the first of several matters during the
past year that required notification of, and cooperation with, Canadian
antitrust authorities, and it provided me with the opportunity to become
better acquainted with my Canadian counterparts, and the various chal-
lenges that confront us together as markets become increasingly global.
I also wish to commend the members of the previous panel for the
excellent comparative study of Canadian and U.S. law;2 it is a very useful
document on which to begin discussions concerning policy proposals,
and the need for any changes.
Before proceeding further, I am obliged to make the usual dis-
claimer that my remarks today are my own, and do not necessarily repre-
sent the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any other individual
Commissioner.
My disclaimer goes further than usual today, since this forum deals
with some issues, specifically those in the area of policy, that are outside
the legal jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission,3 and hence, be-
yond my own portfolio. The issues covered by today's discussions are of
great political interest in the United States and Canada; accordingly, they
are issues that ultimately must be resolved, if at all, by the policy-making
agencies of our government that deal with a vast panoply of competing
interests, going beyond the concerns of competition alone - the Com-
* Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission (Washington, D.C.).
Institut Merieux, S.A., Docket No. C-3301.
2 Feltham, Salen, Mathieson, and Wonnacott, Competition (Antitrust) and Antidumping Laws
in the Context of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, A Study for the Committee on Canada-
United States Relations of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States (Exposure Draft) (Dec. 19, 1990). (Hereinafter "Comparative Study").
3 Under 19 U.S.C. § 1334, the FTC may participate in proceedings before the International
Trade Commission. Examples of such intervention are mentioned later in these remarks.
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merce Department, the U.S. Trade Representative, the State Depart-
ment, and, most of all, the Congress.
II. DUMPING AS A FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE
Those who believe as a basic premise that antitrust policy, as it is
currently understood and applied, should replace current antidumping
regimes should direct their persuasive powers to the political branches of
government. Dumping regimes may result in costs to consumers that, as
a matter of public policy, their society has decided to bear. As one of the
participants in this program, Doug Rosenthal, wrote a couple of years
ago on this subject:
When trade relief is granted, consumers pay more for a product, but
the loss is less immediate and less intense, and it is shared more
broadly throughout the population .... The additional cost of clothing
resulting from the Multifiber Arrangement, for example, rarely threat-
ens family security as does a job layoff. I suspect there is also a strong
component of Judeo-Christian ethics in play: there is the sense that it
would be self-indulgent to focus excessively on consumer interest when
the basic well-being of established enterprises, their employees and
their surrounding towns, is at stake.4
Accordingly, any views that I may have in this area, coming from a
purely competition perspective, may not necessarily be the same as those
who ultimately make the final policy decisions, based possibly on other
considerations. However, we all acknowledge, I believe, that, within the
political realms in which this matter must ultimately be resolved, this is a
fundamental issue which will require policy-makers to engage in both
long-term, and short-term, thinking about what is in our best economic
interest.
When antitrust law is discussed as a replacement for, or complement
to, the dumping laws, the focus is generally on predatory pricing and
price discrimination. Because of time constraints, and the greater rele-
vance of the former, let me share with you some of my thoughts on cur-
rent Commission enforcement policy in the area of predatory pricing. I
would also like to share my experience thus far with the Canada-U.S.
Cooperative Agreement in the hope that it would be generally instructive
with respect to any suggestions to expand and improve transborder anti-
trust enforcement.
III. CURRENT FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICIES
ON PREDATORY PRICING
A. General Principles
Trying to divine a central purpose from a body of statutes and case
4 Rosenthal, Antitrust Implications of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 485, 488-89 (1988).
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law that has evolved over 100 years can be intellectually hazardous; nev-
ertheless, the goal of antitrust policy as conducted by our antitrust en-
forcement agencies is maximizing consumer welfare. In most
circumstances, unfettered competition among rival firms in a free market
is the best means to achieve this objective. Anti-competitive behavior
among market participants may cause less than optimal performance of
the market. To maximize consumer welfare, antitrust law seeks to main-
tain competition by preventing anti-competitive behavior in any given
market.
Antitrust law does not, however, seek to safeguard the welfare of
any particular firm or group of firms in the market. If the competitive
process causes one firm or group of firms to lose market share or even
exit the market, antitrust law focuses on the overall benefit to consumers.
Mitigating the short-term, harsh effects that the competitive process may
have is a social policy question, not an antitrust matter.
These are, admittedly, fairly elementary principles. But, they need
to be repeated from time to time, particularly when antitrust policy - or
the agencies which enforce it - are criticized when, for example, foreign
direct investments, or leveraged buy-outs, or price increases dictated by
supply and demand are not challenged by antitrust enforcers.
Antidumping and countervailing duty law appears, in theory, aimed
at preventing and punishing the same predatory or discriminatory pric-
ing practices in international trade that antitrust law aims at preventing
and punishing domestically. However, antidumping laws may prevent
certain practices that antitrust laws do not because of differences in the
statutory definition of the condemnable practices and their economic un-
derpinnings. At the bottom line, predatory pricing, in antitrust terms,
certainly would be found to be dumping, while aggressive, but not preda-
tory, pricing could also be found to be dumping.
B. Predatory Pricing
The basic concept of predatory pricing can be stated fairly simply.
A firm (or group of firms acting together) lowers price to below cost in
order to drive competitors out of a market. Once the competitors exit,
the remaining firm (or firms) can raise price above cost and reap supra-
normal profits.
Predatory pricing has long been held as illegal anti-competitive be-
havior under American antitrust law. In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,5
the Supreme Court found that Grinnell, a manufacturer of plumbing
supplies and fire sprinkler systems, and three of its subsidiaries, which
provided centralized burglary and fire detection service, willfully monop-
olized the national market for such detection services in violation of Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.6 That section outlaws monopolization or
5 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
6 15 U.S.C. § 2.
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attempts to monopolize interstate trade or commerce. The Court found
that Grinnell's subsidiaries had engaged in predatory behavior, reducing
their minimum basic rates to meet competition, and renewing contracts
at substantially increased rates in cities where Grinnell enjoyed a
monopoly.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has dealt with a number of
predatory pricing cases. In International Telephone and Telegraph
Corp., 7 the Commission reversed an initial finding of an administrative
law judge that Continental Baking, one of ITT's subsidiaries, had at-
tempted to monopolize the sale of white bread in five geographic areas
through predatory pricing. The Commission had previously defined the
elements of attempted monopolization in E.L Du Pont de Nemours &
Co.,8 to include:
(1) specific intent to control prices or destroy competition;
(2) exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct; and,
(3) a dangerous probability of success.
Based on this definition, the Commission went on in the ITT case to
state that proving the first element of the attempted monopolization of-
fense requires establishing a specific intent to control prices or destroy
competition. The Commission noted that any successful business strat-
egy will injure competitors to some degree; such a strategy satisfies the
specific intent requirement only if it contemplates doing so by means of
anticompetitive conduct.
Proving the second element of attempted monopolization offense re-
quires a thorough evaluation of the conduct employed by the firm in-
volved. The Commission noted that the difficult question is, of course,
how to define predatory pricing. It is crucially important to distinguish
prices that are perfectly consistent with competitive behavior, from
prices that are not.9
To make that distinction, the Commission set out two criteria that
an ideal predatory pricing rule must satisfy. "First, it must distinguish
predatory intent from competitive intent."' Second, it must "distin-
guish pricing behavior that is likely to injure competition in the general-
ity of cases from pricing behavior that is not." The Commission
concluded that both of these criteria are addressed by a rule defining
predatory pricing as selling "at a price below long-run average variable
costs for a significant period of time."'"
One effect of healthy competition is to redirect production and sales
7 104 F.T.C. 280 (1984).
8 96 F.T.C. 653, 725 (1980).
9 104 F.T.C. at 400-01.
10 Id. at 402.
11 Id. at 403. There is, however, some debate concerning the appropriate cost standard for
price-cost comparisons. See id. at 451 (Commissioners Patricia Bailey and Michael Pertschuk, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments (2d ed.
1984) at 125.
Vol. 17:177 1991
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from less efficient firms to more efficient rivals. Only when a firm's pric-
ing forces an equally efficient competitor to sell at a price below an ap-
propriate definition of cost for a significant period, causing that
competitor to shut down and injure competition, can the firm be said to
be engaged in predatory pricing.
The Commission uses the average-variable-cost rule to distinguish
presumptively legitimate prices from presumptively predatory prices as
follows:
(1) Sales at prices that equal or exceed average variable cost
should be strongly, often conclusively, presumed to be legal.
(2) Sales at prices below average variable costs for a significant pe-
riod of time should be rebuttably presumed to be anticompetitive.
(3) Sales at price that equal or exceed average total costs should be
conclusively presumed to be legitimate.
12
This brings us to the third, and final, element of the offense defined
by the Commission. "Proving the attempted monopolization offense fi-
nally requires establishing that the conduct at issue created a dangerous
probability that the firm involved would acquire 'power to control price
or exclude competition in the relevant market(s).' "13 The first step in
evaluating "dangerous probability" is delineating the relevant product
and geographic markets with which monopoly power may be acquired.
The next step is to determine whether the conduct at issue created a
dangerous probability that the alleged predator would acquire monopoly
power within those markets. In the Commission's words:
A successful predatory pricing strategy depends on the following sce-
nario: once competition has been injured, the predator will be able to
raise prices to supracompetitive levels long enough to recoup losses
incurred during the predatory period and to earn greater overall profits
that would have been possible from pursuing a competitive strategy.14
Let us bring this down to specifics. Continental had a market share
of 20 percent or less in each of the relevant geographic markets, well
below the 40 percent threshold that courts have generally concluded
must be shown before a dangerous probability of success can be estab-
lished. The Commission concluded that "[i]n this case, the record evi-
dence indicates that it is highly unlikely that Continental could have
acquired monopoly power in any of the relevant markets." 5 The Com-
mission based its decision on a lack of market power, and did not per-
form any detailed analysis of whether price was below cost.
The Commission's approach to resolving liability is generally consis-
tent with the method employed in the Supreme Court's decision in Mat-
12 Id. at 403-04.
13 Id. at 408 (Citation omitted).
14 Id. at 411.
15 Id. at 412.
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sushita Electric Industrial Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 6 which was
decided two years after the =TT decision. The plaintiffs, two American
electronics firms, alleged that Matsushita and six other Japanese elec-
tronics firms had engaged in a massive predatory pricing conspiracy, last-
ing two decades, to drive American producers from the television set
market. The alleged strategy had two components: (1) charging monop-
oly prices in Japan through price-fixing arrangements, and (2) using the
monopoly profits to subsidize below-cost predatory pricing on exports to
the United States. The District Court ordered a summary judgment in
favor of the defendants, but the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, rejecting the motion for summary judgment.
The Supreme Court ruled that where the defendants have estab-
lished a factual basis showing that plaintiffs claims were "implausible -
[i.e.] the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense,"' 7 the plain-
tiffs must offer more persuasive evidence to support their claims than
would otherwise be necessary to survive a motion for summary judg-
ment. The Court found that the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy
would require the conspirators to sustain substantial losses to recover
uncertain gains. Since the alleged conspiracy had not succeeded in two
decades, the Court found the conspiracy implausible, the evidence on
profits in Japan having little relevance, and the plaintiffs' evidence uncon-
vincing. The Court reversed and remanded the Court of Appeals' deci-
sion, warning that such cases can chill conduct that the antitrust laws are
designed to protect.
The authors of the Comparative Study conclude that the U.S. Gov-
ernment takes predatory pricing seriously."8 It does. The information
contained in the Comparative Study comes from the Federal Trade Com-
mission's most recent semi-annual report to Congress on investigations of
predatory pricing complaints. As stated in that report, "[tihe Commis-
sion therefore considers carefully each allegation of predatory pricing it
receives." But, in the interest of full disclosure, I must add that the
Commission's most recent Annual Report also states:
.. Commission staff considers all complaints it receives alleging preda-
tory pricing, although such complaints seldom entail violation of appli-
cable legal standards. 19
Nevertheless, in a recent article, Rick Rogers, of the Ford Motor
Company, asserts that "in the 'real world', real judges and real juries are
assessing real treble damages against companies perceived to have en-
gaged in unlawful predatory pricing."2 ° Thus, predatory pricing cases
16 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
17 Id. at 587.
18 Comparative Study at 13 n.16.
19 Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended September 30,
1989, at 11.
20 Richard B. Rogers, Predatory Pricing: A Practical Perspective, 5 ANTITRUST 9 (1990).
Vol. 17:177 1991
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are not common; but, neither are they as rare as unicorns.
C. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law
By contrast, antidumping and countervailing duty law has been in-
terpreted to protect domestic competitors as well as competition. In
USX Corp. v. United States,El the Court of International Trade remanded
to the International Trade Commission (ITC) a petition by USX Corpo-
ration, a domestic steel producer, requesting a countervailing duty on
cold-rolled carbon steel plates and sheets from Argentina." z The ITC's
initial decision denying the duty stated that the U.S. "antidumping stat-
ute is intended to protect U.S. industry only from unfair price discrimi-
nation in the form of predatory pricing."2 3 The Court reasoned:
The problem with this position is two-fold. One flaw is that this view
necessarily makes the intent of a foreign producer the focus of the ITC
causation inquiry. Another, but not unrelated flaw, is that this view
seems to assume that the purpose of the antidumping statute is to pre-
vent a particular type of 'injury to competition' rather than merely
material 'injury to industry.'2 4
The 'injury to industry' standard focuses explicitly upon conditions in
the U.S. industry. In effect, Congress has made a judgment that causally
related injury to the domestic industry may be severe enough to justify
relief from less than fair value imports even if, from another viewpoint,
the economy could be said to be better served by providing no relief.
Thus, any causation analysis must have at its core the issue of whether
the imports at issue cause, in a non de minimis manner, the material
injury to the industry which has been found.25
Hence, antitrust law may be only a partial substitute for antidump-
ing and countervailing duty law. As long as detailed price and cost infor-
mation is available from foreign firms, antitrust law can confront "injury
to competition" problems through the enforcement of the prohibition on
predatory pricing. On the other hand, antitrust law does not address the
"injury to competitors" issues that is an apparently important aim of the
antidumping statute for many constituents of our policy-making
agencies.
21 682 F. Supp. 60 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
22 USX initially challenged the ITC's final negative determination regarding Argentine steel.
The Court of International Trade (CIT) remanded. 655 F. Supp. 487 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). On
remand, the Commission again made a negative determination. Challenge was again filed. The CIT
reversed and remanded again. 682 F. Supp. 60 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). On subsequent remand, the
ITC found that the United States industry was not materially injured or threatened. USX filed
another challenge and moved for a judgment on the record. The CIT denied this motion. 698 F.
Supp. 234 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
23 682 F. Supp. at 65.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 65-67.
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D. The Role of the FTC in ITC Proceedings
The importance of the impact of competition concerns on trade mat-
ters should not be underestimated, however. The Federal Trade Com-
mission may intervene in antidumping cases before the International
Trade Commission on behalf of consumers to protect competition. The
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, provides that the FTC "shall fully coop-
erate" with ITC "for purposes of aiding and assisting its work."26 Con-
sistent with this responsibility, the FTC has intervened in a number of
antidumping cases before the ITC to craft remedies that maximize con-
sumer welfare.27 For example, in OKI Electric Industry Company, Ltd.
v. United States,28 the FTC argued in an amicus curiae brief that it is a
normal business practice to sell 64K DRAMS (dynamic random access
memory computer chips of 64 kilobits) below their total average cost
when there is an unanticipated slowdown in demand for 64K DRAMS
and when an older generation of DRAMS is being replaced by newer
generations. The FTC recommended that this case be remanded for re-
consideration of an antidumping duty that had been imposed by the In-
ternational Trade Commission. The Court of International Trade
granted the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief from the antidumping
duty.
E. Conclusions
We might conclude that the predatory pricing doctrine has evolved
to reflect economic reality in the marketplace. It clearly does not pro-
scribe and punish as much pricing behavior as the dumping laws. Pre-
sumably, the dumping laws are intended to achieve other public policy
goals, and the debate will need to focus on whether those goals remain in
the public interest of the United States and Canada.
IV. THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES29
I would like to turn now to the Cooperative Agreement between
26 19 U.S.C. § 1334.
27 Since 1984, the FTC filed interventions before the ITC in antidumping cases involving apple
juice, ball bearings, copper, electric shavers, fish, footwear, lumber, specialty steel, toner, and vertical
millings.
28 669 F. Supp. 480 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). In 1985, Micron Technologies, Inc. filed petitions
with the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission alleging imports of
64K DRAMs from Japan were being sold at less than fair value (LTFV) and these imports were
threatening material injury to the domestic industry. The Commerce Department found that 64K
DRAMs were being sold at LTFV (April 29, 1986), and the ITC found material injury because of
Japanese imports (June 11, 1986). Consequently, an antidumping duty of 35.34 percent was or-
dered. OKI challenged the lawfulness of this order, claiming that the Commerce Department made
numerous errors in calculating costs and sales prices of 64K DRAMs in Japan, and sought to re-
mand the case and receive a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the duty.
29 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Canada and the Government
Vol. 17:177 1991
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Canada and the U.S., providing for notification, consultation, and coop-
eration in the enforcement of our respective antitrust laws. There are
many fairly routine notifications during the course of a year, and, this
year, a couple of matters requiring notifications resulted in enforcement
recommendations that came before the Commission. Our deliberations
on those matters raised some interesting questions about implementation
of the agreement that could prove pertinent in a predatory pricing
context.
The first issue is the question of what triggers a notification. Section
2 of the Cooperative Agreement lists situations that require notification.
They include investigations likely to inquire into activities carried out in
the other country; investigations where it is expected that information to
be sought is located in the other country; and investigations that may
reasonably be expected to lead to enforcement action likely to affect a
national interest of the other country. Clearly, these are all scenarios
that might arise in a predatory pricing context.
What is in the respective national interests of our two countries is
certainly open to interpretation. If the Free Trade Agreement has the
desired effect upon Canada-U.S. trade, I expect that the competition au-
thorities will see more and more matters where the geographic market
will be defined as Canada and the U.S. If that is the case, we must be
prepared on both sides to make notification second nature. It is my view
that, if anyone is to err, it is better to err on the side of notifying; put
more simply, "When in doubt, notify."
By way of further interpretation, I believe that "enforcement ac-
tion," as the term is used generally and in this Agreement, ought to in-
clude consent agreements between an enforcement authority and a party
charged with illegal conduct, such as predatory pricing.
There are at least two types of settlement provisions that arguably
could be viewed as at least potentially affecting the national interest of
the other party. The first type involves injunctive provisions or provi-
sions that require or prohibit conduct in the other country. The second
type of settlement provision includes requirements for the production of
documents of information from the other country generally for the pur-
pose of securing compliance with the substantive provisions of the
settlement.
Although consent agreements and other settlements are not ex-
pressly mentioned in the Agreement, it seems to me that it would be at
least within the spirit of the Agreement to provide notification and op-
portunity to consult in cases that are settled without litigation. Never-
theless, I recognize that the dynamics of the negotiation process make it
the United States of America as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation With Respect to the
Application of National Antitrust Laws, March 9, 1984, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1
13,503 (hereafter Cooperative Agreement).
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difficult to establish precise criteria for the timing of such notifications
and consultations.
Having said that, we are then confronted with the question of what
information can be shared with the other party under Section 9 of the
Cooperative Agreement. U.S. Competition authorities may share infor-
mation obtained in our investigations with state and local law enforce-
ment authorities, with the exception of information contained in
premerger notifications provided under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
Whether the laws, such as Section 21 of the FTC Act, which allow
for the sharing of investigative information with state and local law en-
forcement authorities, should be amended to include governments, such
as Canada, with whom we have cooperative law enforcement treaties or
agreements, is something that will have to be decided by the Congress. It
is clear to me, though, that such a grant might not be completely unprec-
edented. As the Comparative Study points out,30 the Canada-United
States Income Tax Convention provides for the sharing of law enforce-
ment information, and, as clarified by Congress in the 1988 tax bill,31
that information includes tax return information which is considered to
be some of the most sensitive information maintained by the government,
and is otherwise tightly withheld.3 2 I am also aware that the Commis-
sion has provided investigatory information to Canadian authorities pur-
suant to the Canada-U.S. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, or MLAT. I am certainly open, as I have been in the field of
state-federal relations, to facilitating the sharing of investigative informa-
tion, if our respective governments will agree to authorize it, and there is
full protection for the confidentiality of sensitive business documents.
Sharing of investigative information between governments suggests
that some business transactions or practices may fall within the subject
matter jurisdiction of both countries. Where more than one authority
has subject matter jurisdiction over a matter, and personal jurisdiction
can be had in either locale, it seems that it is in the best interests of the
parties, as I have observed particularly in the merger context, that they
cooperate with both authorities. Some, including myself,33 have talked
about using conflict of law principles and principles of comity to resolve
differences where concurrent jurisdiction exists. I am content, for the
time being, to stick with the case-by-case approach to resolving such
matters that fall within concurrent jurisdiction.
What I have attempted to do here is to give you an overview of how
the Federal Trade Commission has approached the type of anti-competi-
tive conduct that is of greatest relevance in the context of an antidump-
30 Comparative Study at 152-154.
31 P.L. 100-647, § 1012(aa).
32 See 26 U.S.C. 6103.
33 See Owen and Parisi, "International Mergers and Joint Ventures: A Federal Trade Com-
mission Perspective," before the 17th Annual Fordharn Corporate Law Institute, New York (Oct.
18, 1990), at 10-20.
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ing debate, and to provide some highlights of our cooperative working
relationships with our Canadian counterparts. As one whose legal career
has spanned service to the Congress, the Executive Branch, and the busi-
ness community, I hope that you will understand my repeated deference
to the policy-makers involved in this area. Antitrust law currently com-
plements our antidumping laws - whether it will subsume them will be
decided after a weighing of views from different constituencies, including
those of us with competition portfolios. This program has provided an
invaluable focusing of the debate, and I appreciate the opportunity to be
a part of it.
11
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